| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13403 |
| DP13403 Organizational Equilibrium with Capital | |
| Zhen Huo | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-12-19 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper proposes a new equilibrium concept - organizational equilibrium - for models with state variables that have a time-inconsistency problem. The key elements of this equilibrium concept are: (1) agents are allowed to ignore the history and restart the equilibrium; (2) agents can wait for future agents to start the equilibrium. We apply this equilibrium concept to a quasi-geometric discounting growth model and to a problem of optimal dynamic fiscal policy. We find that the allocation gradually transits from that implied by its Markov perfect equilibrium towards that implied by the solution under commitment, but stopping short of the Ramsey outcome. The feature that the time inconsistency problem is resolved slowly over time rationalizes the notion that good will is valuable but has to be built gradually. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics and Growth ; Monetary Economics and Fluctuations ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Time inconsistency Capital-income taxation Quasi-geometric discounting Reputation Renegotiation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13403 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542214 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Zhen Huo. DP13403 Organizational Equilibrium with Capital. 2018. |
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