| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13405 |
| DP13405 Artificial intelligence, algorithmic pricing and collusion | |
| Emilio Calvano; Giacomo Calzolari; Vincenzo Denicolò; Sergio Pastorello | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-12-20 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Increasingly, pricing algorithms are supplanting human decision making in real marketplaces. To inform the competition policy debate on the possible consequences of this development, we experiment with pricing algorithms powered by Artificial Intelligence (AI) in controlled environments (computer simulations), studying the interaction among a number of Q-learning algorithms in a workhorse oligopoly model of price competition with Logit demand and constant marginal costs. In this setting the algorithms consistently learn to charge supra-competitive prices, without communicating with one another. The high prices are sustained by classical collusive strategies with a finite phase of punishment followed by a gradual return to cooperation. This finding is robust to asymmetries in cost or demand and to changes in the number of players. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Artificial intelligence Pricing-algorithms Collusion Reinforcement learning Q-learning |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13405-0 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542217 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Emilio Calvano,Giacomo Calzolari,Vincenzo Denicolò,et al. DP13405 Artificial intelligence, algorithmic pricing and collusion. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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