| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13415 |
| DP13415 Exchange Competition, Entry, and Welfare | |
| Giovanni Cespa; Xavier Vives | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-12-26 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We assess the consequences for market quality and welfare of different entry regimes and exchange pricing policies, integrating a microstructure model with a free-entry, exchange competition model where exchanges have market power in technological services. Free-entry delivers superior liquidity and welfare outcomes vis-à-vis an unregulated monopoly, but entry can be excessive or insufficient. Depending on the extent of the monopolist's technological services undersupply compared to the first best, a planner can achieve a higher welfare controlling entry or platform fees. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Market fragmentation Welfare Endogenous market structure Platform competition Cournot with free entry Industrial organization of exchanges |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13415-3 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542228 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Giovanni Cespa,Xavier Vives. DP13415 Exchange Competition, Entry, and Welfare. 2018. |
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