| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13420 |
| DP13420 Blockchain Economics | |
| Joseph Abadi; Markus Brunnermeier | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-12-28 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | When is record-keeping better arranged through a blockchain than through a traditional centralized intermediary? The ideal qualities of any record-keeping system are (i) correctness, (ii) decentralization, and (iii) cost efficiency. We point out a \textit{blockchain trilemma}: no ledger can satisfy all three properties simultaneously. A centralized record-keeper extracts rents due to its monopoly on the ledger. Its franchise value dynamically incentivizes correct reporting. Blockchains drive down rents by allowing for free entry of record-keepers and portability of information to competing "forks.'' Blockchains must therefore provide static incentives for correctness through computationally expensive proof-of-work algorithms and permit record-keepers to roll back history in order to undo fraudulent reports. While blockchains can keep track of ownership transfers, enforcement of possession rights is often better complemented by centralized record-keeping. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization ; International Macroeconomics and Finance ; Monetary Economics and Fluctuations |
| 关键词 | Blockchain economics Fintech Cryptocurrencies Digital currencies Distributed ledger technology |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13420 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542234 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Joseph Abadi,Markus Brunnermeier. DP13420 Blockchain Economics. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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