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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP13424 |
DP13424 Fighting Mobile Crime | |
Rosario Crinò; Giovanni Immordino; Salvatore Piccolo | |
发表日期 | 2019-01-03 |
出版年 | 2019 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | Two countries set their enforcement non-cooperatively to deter native and foreign individuals from committing crime in their territory. Crime is mobile, ex ante (migration) and ex post (fleeing), and criminals hiding abroad after having committed a crime in a country must be extradited back. When extradition is not too costly, countries overinvest in enforcement: insourcing foreign criminals is more costly than paying the extradition cost. When extradition is sufficiently costly, instead, a large enforcement may induce criminals to flee the country whose law they infringed. The fear of paying the extradition cost enables the countries coordinating on the efficient outcome. |
主题 | Public Economics |
关键词 | Crime Enforcement Extradition Fleeing Migration |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13424 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542238 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Rosario Crinò,Giovanni Immordino,Salvatore Piccolo. DP13424 Fighting Mobile Crime. 2019. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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