| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13441 |
| DP13441 Strategic Interpretations | |
| Kfir Eliaz; Ran Spiegler; Heidi C Thysen | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-01-10 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study strategic communication when the sender can influence the receiver's understanding of messages' equilibrium meaning. We focus on a "pure persuasion" setting, in which the informed sender wants the uninformed receiver to always choose "accept". The sender's strategy maps each state of Nature to a distribution over pairs consisting of: (i) a multi-dimensional message, and (ii) a "dictionary" that credibly discloses the state-dependent distribution of some of the messsage's components. The receiver does not know the sender's strategy by default; he can only interpret message components that are covered by the dictionary he is provided with. We characterize the sender's optimal persuasion strategy and show that full persuasion is possible when the prior on the acceptance state exceeds a threshold that quickly decreases with message dimensionality. We extend our analysis to situations where interpretation of messages is done by a third party with uncertain preferences, and explore alternative notions of "dictionaries". |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13441 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542256 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Kfir Eliaz,Ran Spiegler,Heidi C Thysen. DP13441 Strategic Interpretations. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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