| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13461 |
| DP13461 Organizing Competition for the Market | |
| Elisabetta Iossa; Patrick Rey; Michael Waterson | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-01-16 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The paper studies competition for the market in a setting where incumbents (and, to a lesser extent, neighboring incumbents) benefit from a cost advantage. The paper first compares the outcome of staggered and synchronous tenders, before drawing the implications for market design. We find that the timing of tenders should depend on the likelihood of monopolization. When monopolization is expected, synchronous tendering is preferable, as it strengthens the pressure that entrants exercise on the monopolist. When instead other firms remain active, staggered tendering is preferable, as it maximizes the competitive pressure that comes from the other firms. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Dynamic procurement Incumbency advantage Local monopoly Competition Asymmetric auctions Synchronous contracts Staggered contracts |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13461-0 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542276 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Elisabetta Iossa,Patrick Rey,Michael Waterson. DP13461 Organizing Competition for the Market. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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