G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP13472
DP13472 Investor Protection and Asset Prices
Suleyman Basak; Georgy Chabakauri; M. Deniz Yavuz
发表日期2019-01-22
出版年2019
语种英语
摘要Empirical evidence suggests that investor protection has significant effects on ownership concentration and asset prices. We develop a dynamic asset pricing model to address the empirical regularities and uncover some of the underlying mechanisms at play. Our model features a controlling shareholder who endogenously accumulates control over a firm and diverts a fraction of its output. Better investor protection decreases stock holdings of controlling shareholders, increases stock mean-returns, and increases stock return volatilities when ownership concentration is sufficiently high, consistent with the related empirical evidence. The model also predicts that better protection increases interest rates and decreases the controlling shareholder’s leverage.
主题Financial Economics
关键词Investor protection Asset pricing Controlling shareholders Expropriation Stock holdings
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp13472
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542287
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Suleyman Basak,Georgy Chabakauri,M. Deniz Yavuz. DP13472 Investor Protection and Asset Prices. 2019.
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