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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP13472 |
DP13472 Investor Protection and Asset Prices | |
Suleyman Basak; Georgy Chabakauri; M. Deniz Yavuz | |
发表日期 | 2019-01-22 |
出版年 | 2019 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | Empirical evidence suggests that investor protection has significant effects on ownership concentration and asset prices. We develop a dynamic asset pricing model to address the empirical regularities and uncover some of the underlying mechanisms at play. Our model features a controlling shareholder who endogenously accumulates control over a firm and diverts a fraction of its output. Better investor protection decreases stock holdings of controlling shareholders, increases stock mean-returns, and increases stock return volatilities when ownership concentration is sufficiently high, consistent with the related empirical evidence. The model also predicts that better protection increases interest rates and decreases the controlling shareholder’s leverage. |
主题 | Financial Economics |
关键词 | Investor protection Asset pricing Controlling shareholders Expropriation Stock holdings |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13472 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542287 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Suleyman Basak,Georgy Chabakauri,M. Deniz Yavuz. DP13472 Investor Protection and Asset Prices. 2019. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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