G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP13479
DP13479 Storable Votes and Quadratic Voting. An Experiment on Four California Propositions
Alessandra Casella; Luis Sanchez
发表日期2019-01-23
出版年2019
语种英语
摘要Storable Votes and Quadratic Voting are voting systems designed to account for voters' intensity of preferences. We test their performance in two samples of California residents using data on four initiatives prepared for the 2016 California ballot. We bootstrap the original samples and generate two sets of 10,000 multi-elections simulations. As per design, both systems induce minority victories and result in higher expected welfare relative to majority voting. In our parametrization, quadratic voting induces more minority victories and achieves higher average welfare, but causes more frequent inefficient minority victories. The results are robust to different plausible rules-of-thumb in casting votes.
主题Public Economics
关键词Democracy Voting Majority
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp13479
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542293
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Alessandra Casella,Luis Sanchez. DP13479 Storable Votes and Quadratic Voting. An Experiment on Four California Propositions. 2019.
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