| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13488 |
| DP13488 Partial Language Competence | |
| Jeanne Hagenbach; Frédéric Koessler | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-01-25 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper proposes an equilibrium concept, Language-Based Expectation Equilibrium, which accounts for partial language understanding in sender-receiver cheap talk games. Each player has a privately known language competence representing all the messages that he understands. For the messages he does not understand, he has correct but coarse expectations about the equilibrium strategies of the other player. In general, a language-based expectation equilibrium outcome differs from Nash and communication equilibrium outcomes, but is always a Bayesian solution. Partial language competence of the sender rationalizes information transmission and lies in pure persuasion problems, and facilitates information transmission from a moderately biased sender. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Analogy-based expectations Bayesian solution Bounded rationality Cheap talk Language |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13488 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542304 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jeanne Hagenbach,Frédéric Koessler. DP13488 Partial Language Competence. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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