| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13494 |
| DP13494 Equity Finance: Matching Liability to Power | |
| Charles A. E. Goodhart; Rosa Lastra | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-01-28 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | There is widespread concern that the bonus culture for senior managers in limited liability companies is having adverse effects, e.g. on risk-taking, leverage and lower longer-term investment. The moral hazard of limited liability was appreciated in the 19th century, when unlimited or multiple liability, especially for bankers, was widely adopted. Whereas outside, notably retail, investors still need the protection of limited liability, we advocate moving towards a two-tier equity system, primarily for banks, with insiders, senior managers and others with influence over corporate decisions, becoming subject to multiple liability. But the transition costs of doing so suddenly would be great, so our proposal is to start by applying this initially just to Systemically Important Financial Intermediaries. |
| 主题 | Monetary Economics and Fluctuations |
| 关键词 | Corporate governance Limited liability Two tier equity Senior management regime Institutional investors Banks Banking |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13494 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542310 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Charles A. E. Goodhart,Rosa Lastra. DP13494 Equity Finance: Matching Liability to Power. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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