| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13512 |
| DP13512 Tax administration and compliance: evidence from medieval Paris | |
| Nathan Sussman; Al Slivinski | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-02-06 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze the Parisian taille of the late 13th century - a taxation mechanism used to finance periodic major expenditures by the French Crown, including wars. Our major finding is that this system was remarkably successful along a number of dimensions, in an environment without the administrative structures used by contemporary governments. The taille’s essential features were; an agreement between the king and city government to collect a fixed amount of revenue, and a collection process that made use of information about taxpayers held by their fellow artisans and/or neighbors. We show that it collected considerable sums without social unrest, with high levels of compliance, and administrative costs that were low even by modern standards. We also argue that its success may have lessons for improved tax collection and compliance in contemporary less-developed economies. |
| 主题 | Economic History |
| 关键词 | Taxation Evasion Compliance Institutions Fairness Middle ages Paris |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13512 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542329 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Nathan Sussman,Al Slivinski. DP13512 Tax administration and compliance: evidence from medieval Paris. 2019. |
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