| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13542 |
| DP13542 Optimal Selling Mechanisms with Endogenous Proposal Rights | |
| Nenad Kos; Sarah Auster; Salvatore Piccolo | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-02-21 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study a model of optimal pricing where the right to propose a mechanism is determined endogenously: a privately informed buyer covertly invests to increase the probability of offering a mechanism. We establish the existence of equilibrium and show that higher types get to propose a mechanism more often than lower types allowing the seller to learn from the trading process. In any equilibrium, the seller either offers the price he would have offered if he was always the one to make an offer or randomises over prices. Pure strategy equilibria may fail to exist, even when types are continuously distributed. A full characterization of equilibria is provided in the model with two types, where notably the seller's profit is shown to be non-monotonic in the share of high-value buyers. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Mechanism design Optimal pricing Bargaining power |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13542 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542360 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Nenad Kos,Sarah Auster,Salvatore Piccolo. DP13542 Optimal Selling Mechanisms with Endogenous Proposal Rights. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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