| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13543 |
| DP13543 Controlling Sellers Who Provide Advice: Regulation and Competition | |
| Jerome Pouyet; David Martimort; Denis Gromb; David Bardey | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-02-21 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A monopoly seller advises buyers about which of two goods best fits their needs but may be tempted to steer buyers towards the higher margin good. For the seller to collect information about a buyer's needs and provide truthful advice, the profits from selling both goods must lie within an implementability cone. In the optimal regulation, pricing distortions and information-collection incentives are controlled separately by price regulation and fixed rewards respectively. This no longer holds when the seller has private information about costs as both problems interact. We study the extent to which competition and the threat by buyers to switch sellers can substitute for regulation. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Mis-selling Expertise Regulation Asymmetric information |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13543 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542361 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jerome Pouyet,David Martimort,Denis Gromb,et al. DP13543 Controlling Sellers Who Provide Advice: Regulation and Competition. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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