| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9836 |
| DP9836 Legal Evolution, Contract Evolution, and Standardization | |
| Enrico Perotti; Nicola Gennaioli; Giacomo Ponzetto | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-02-21 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In a model where biased judges can distort contract enforcement, we uncover positive feedback effects between the use of innovative contracts and legal evolution that improve verifiability and contracting over time. We find, however, that the cost of judicial bias also grows over time because the unpredictable application of precedents becomes costlier as the law matures. Contract standardization avoids this cost, statically improving enforcement; but it crowds out innovative contracts, hindering legal evolution. We shed light on the large-scale commercial codification undertaken in the nineteenth century in many common-law countries during a period of booming long-distance trade. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Contracts Imperfect enforcement Legal evolution Precedents Standardization |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9836 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542396 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Enrico Perotti,Nicola Gennaioli,Giacomo Ponzetto. DP9836 Legal Evolution, Contract Evolution, and Standardization. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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