| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13562 |
| DP13562 Social Proximity and Bureaucrat Performance: Evidence from India | |
| Marianne Bertrand | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-03-01 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Using exogenous variation in social proximity generated by an allocation rule, we find that bureaucrats assigned to their home states are perceived to be more corrupt and less able to withstand illegitimate political pressure. Despite this, we observe that home officers are more likely to be promoted in the later stages of their careers. To understand this dissonance between performance and promotion we show that incoming Chief Ministers preferentially promote home officers that come from the same home district. Taken together, our results suggest that social proximity hampers bureaucrat performance by facilitating political capture and corruption. |
| 主题 | Development Economics |
| 关键词 | Social proximity Bureaucrat performance Performance and promotion Political economy |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13562 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542418 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marianne Bertrand. DP13562 Social Proximity and Bureaucrat Performance: Evidence from India. 2019. |
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