G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP12936
DP12936 Price Customization and Targeting in Matching Markets
Renato Gomes; Alessandro Pavan
发表日期2019-03-14
出版年2019
语种英语
摘要We investigate the effects on targeting and welfare of uniform pricing (be it explicitly mandated, induced by privacy regulations, or the result of the transition from a centralized to a decentralized market structure). We build a model of many-to-many matching in which preferences are both vertically and horizontally differentiated. In the absence of uniform-price obligations, platforms maximize profits through price customization, using information on local elasticities. We show how uniform pricing may either increase or decrease targeting, and identify conditions under which it is beneficial to consumer surplus. The analysis has implications for online retailing, ad exchanges, and media markets
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Many-to-many matching Asymmetric information Platforms Incentives Price discrimination
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp12936-0
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542440
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Renato Gomes,Alessandro Pavan. DP12936 Price Customization and Targeting in Matching Markets. 2019.
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