| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13587 |
| DP13587 When in Rome... on local norms and sentencing decisions | |
| roberto galbiati; Emeric Henry; Arnaud Philippe; David Abrams | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-03-15 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In this paper, we show that sentencing norms vary widely even across geographically close units. By examining North Carolina's unique judicial rotation system, we show that judges arriving in a new court gradually converge to local sentencing norms. We document factors that facilitate this convergence and show that sentencing norms are predicted by preferences of the local constituents. We build on these empirical results to analyze theoretically the delegation trade-off faced by a social planner: the judge can learn the local norm, but only at the cost of potential capture. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Norms Laws Judicial decision making Delegation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13587 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542445 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | roberto galbiati,Emeric Henry,Arnaud Philippe,et al. DP13587 When in Rome... on local norms and sentencing decisions. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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