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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP13590 |
DP13590 Marriage Market Equilibrium, Qualifications, and Ability | |
Dan Anderberg; Jesper Bagger; Venkataraman Bhaskar; Tanya Wilson | |
发表日期 | 2019-03-16 |
出版年 | 2019 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We study marital sorting on academic qualifications and latent ability in an equilibrium marriage market model using the 1972 UK Raising of the School-Leaving Age (RoSLA) legislation as a natural experiment that induced a sudden, large shift in the distribution of academic qualifications in affected cohorts, but plausibly had no impact on the distribution of ability. We show that a Choo- Siow (2006) style model with sorting on cohort, qualifications, and latent ability is identified and estimable using the RoSLA-induced population shifts. We find that the RoSLA isolated low ability individuals in the marriage market, and affected marital outcomes of individuals whose qualification attainment were unaffected. We also decompose the difference in marriage probabilities between unqualified individuals and those with basic qualifications into causal effects stemming from ability and qualification differences. Differences in marriage probabilities are almost entirely driven by ability. |
主题 | Labour Economics |
关键词 | Marriage Qualifications Assortative mating Latent ability |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13590 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542448 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Dan Anderberg,Jesper Bagger,Venkataraman Bhaskar,et al. DP13590 Marriage Market Equilibrium, Qualifications, and Ability. 2019. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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