| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13617 |
| DP13617 Bank Capital Forbearance | |
| Natalya Martynova; Enrico Perotti; Javier Suarez | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-03-25 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze the strategic interaction between undercapitalized banks and a supervisor who may intervene by preventive recapitalization. Supervisory forbearance emerges because of a commitment problem, reinforced by fiscal costs and constrained capacity. Private incentives to comply are lower when supervisors have lower credibility, especially for highly levered banks. Less credible supervisors (facing higher cost of intervention) end up intervening more banks, yet producing higher forbearance and systemic costs of bank distress. Importantly, when public intervention capacity is constrained, private recapitalization decisions become strategic complements, leading to equilibria with extremely high forbearance and high systemic costs of bank failure. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Bank supervision Bank recapitalization Forbearance |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13617 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542476 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Natalya Martynova,Enrico Perotti,Javier Suarez. DP13617 Bank Capital Forbearance. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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