G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP13640
DP13640 Growth Firms and Relationship Finance: A Capital Structure Approach
Roman Inderst; Vladimir Vladimirov
发表日期2019-04-02
出版年2019
语种英语
摘要We analyze how relationship finance, such as venture capital and relationship lending, affects growth firm's capital structure choices. We show that relationship investors that obtain a strong bargaining position due to their privileged information about the firm, optimally cash in on their dominance by pushing it to finance follow-up investments with equity. The firm underinvests if its owner refuses to accept the associated dilution. However, this problem is mitigated if the firm's initial relationship financing involves high leverage or offers initial investors preferential treatment in liquidation. By contrast, if initial investors are unlikely to gain a dominant position, firms optimally lever up only in later rounds. Our implications for relationship and venture capital financing highlight that the degree of investor dominance is of key importance for growth firm's capital structure decisions.
主题Financial Economics
关键词Financial contracting Relationship financing Dominant investors Equity financing
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp13640
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542499
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Roman Inderst,Vladimir Vladimirov. DP13640 Growth Firms and Relationship Finance: A Capital Structure Approach. 2019.
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