| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13641 |
| DP13641 Regulating Cancellation Rights with Consumer Experimentation | |
| Roman Inderst; Florian Hoffmann | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-04-02 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Embedding consumer experimentation with a product or service into a market environment, we find that unregulated contracts induce too few returns or cancellations, as they do not internalize a pecuniary externality on other firms in the market. Forcing firms to let consumers learn longer by imposing a commonly observed statutory minimum cancellation or refund period is socially efficient only when firms appropriate much of the market surplus, while it backfires otherwise. Interestingly, cancellation rights are a poor predictor of competition, as in the unregulated outcome firms grant particularly generous rights when competition is neither too low nor too high. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13641 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542500 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Roman Inderst,Florian Hoffmann. DP13641 Regulating Cancellation Rights with Consumer Experimentation. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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