| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13642 |
| DP13642 Managing Channel Profits when Retailers have Profitable Outside Options | |
| Roman Inderst; Greg Shaffer | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-04-02 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The channel-coordination literature typically focuses on how a supplier canovercome channel inefficiencies stemming from misaligned pricing incentives. In contrast, we show that when an incumbent supplier faces competition from other suppliers to supply the downstream firms, it may want to create inefficiencies. Our analysis offers useful prescriptions for how incumbent suppliers should react to competitive threats by smaller competitors, how manufacturers should react to powerful retailers who can produce their own private-label brands, and how upstream firms should optimally treat downstream firms who may have different marginal costs of distribution. Our analysis also explains why wholesale prices and thus final-goods prices would be expected to decrease when there is an increase in upstream or downstream competition. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Channel coordination Game theory Distribution channels |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13642-0 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542501 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Roman Inderst,Greg Shaffer. DP13642 Managing Channel Profits when Retailers have Profitable Outside Options. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
| 个性服务 |
| 推荐该条目 |
| 保存到收藏夹 |
| 导出为Endnote文件 |
| 谷歌学术 |
| 谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
| [Roman Inderst]的文章 |
| [Greg Shaffer]的文章 |
| 百度学术 |
| 百度学术中相似的文章 |
| [Roman Inderst]的文章 |
| [Greg Shaffer]的文章 |
| 必应学术 |
| 必应学术中相似的文章 |
| [Roman Inderst]的文章 |
| [Greg Shaffer]的文章 |
| 相关权益政策 |
| 暂无数据 |
| 收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
