G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP13643
DP13643 Only time will tell: A theory of deferred compensation
Roman Inderst; Marcus Opp
发表日期2019-04-02
出版年2019
语种英语
摘要This paper provides a complete characterization of optimal contracts in principal-agent settings where the agent’s action has persistent effects. We model generalinformation environments via the stochastic process of the likelihood-ratio. Themartingale property of this performance metric captures the information benefit ofdeferral. Costs of deferral may result from both the agent’s relative impatience aswell as her consumption smoothing needs. If the relatively impatient agent is riskneutral, optimal contracts take a simple form in that they only reward maximalperformance for at most two payout dates. If the agent is additionally risk-averse,optimal contracts stipulate rewards for a larger selection of dates and performancestates: The performance hurdle to obtain the same level of compensation is in-creasing over time whereas the pay-performance sensitivity is declining. We derivetestable implications for the optimal duration of (executive) compensation and thematurity structure of claims in financial contracting settings.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Compensation design Duration of pay Moral hazard Persistence Principal-agent models Informativeness principle
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp13643
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542502
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Roman Inderst,Marcus Opp. DP13643 Only time will tell: A theory of deferred compensation. 2019.
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