Gateway to Think Tanks
来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP13643 |
DP13643 Only time will tell: A theory of deferred compensation | |
Roman Inderst; Marcus Opp | |
发表日期 | 2019-04-02 |
出版年 | 2019 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | This paper provides a complete characterization of optimal contracts in principal-agent settings where the agent’s action has persistent effects. We model generalinformation environments via the stochastic process of the likelihood-ratio. Themartingale property of this performance metric captures the information benefit ofdeferral. Costs of deferral may result from both the agent’s relative impatience aswell as her consumption smoothing needs. If the relatively impatient agent is riskneutral, optimal contracts take a simple form in that they only reward maximalperformance for at most two payout dates. If the agent is additionally risk-averse,optimal contracts stipulate rewards for a larger selection of dates and performancestates: The performance hurdle to obtain the same level of compensation is in-creasing over time whereas the pay-performance sensitivity is declining. We derivetestable implications for the optimal duration of (executive) compensation and thematurity structure of claims in financial contracting settings. |
主题 | Industrial Organization |
关键词 | Compensation design Duration of pay Moral hazard Persistence Principal-agent models Informativeness principle |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13643 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542502 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Roman Inderst,Marcus Opp. DP13643 Only time will tell: A theory of deferred compensation. 2019. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
个性服务 |
推荐该条目 |
保存到收藏夹 |
导出为Endnote文件 |
谷歌学术 |
谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
[Roman Inderst]的文章 |
[Marcus Opp]的文章 |
百度学术 |
百度学术中相似的文章 |
[Roman Inderst]的文章 |
[Marcus Opp]的文章 |
必应学术 |
必应学术中相似的文章 |
[Roman Inderst]的文章 |
[Marcus Opp]的文章 |
相关权益政策 |
暂无数据 |
收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。