| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13644 |
| DP13644 Buyer Power and Mutual Dependency in a Model of Negotiations | |
| Roman Inderst; João Montez | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-04-02 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study bilateral bargaining between several buyers and sellers in a framework that allowsboth sides, in case of a bilateral disagreement, flexibility to adjust trade with each of their othertrading partners and receive the gross benefit generated by each adjustment. A larger buyer paysa higher per-unit price when buyers’ bargaining power in bilateral negotiations is sufficientlylow, and a lower price otherwise. An analogous result holds for sellers. These predictions, andthe implications of different technologies, are explained by the fact that size is a source of mutualdependency and not an unequivocal source of power. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13644 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542503 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Roman Inderst,João Montez. DP13644 Buyer Power and Mutual Dependency in a Model of Negotiations. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
| 个性服务 |
| 推荐该条目 |
| 保存到收藏夹 |
| 导出为Endnote文件 |
| 谷歌学术 |
| 谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
| [Roman Inderst]的文章 |
| [João Montez]的文章 |
| 百度学术 |
| 百度学术中相似的文章 |
| [Roman Inderst]的文章 |
| [João Montez]的文章 |
| 必应学术 |
| 必应学术中相似的文章 |
| [Roman Inderst]的文章 |
| [João Montez]的文章 |
| 相关权益政策 |
| 暂无数据 |
| 收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
