| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13647 |
| DP13647 Networks in Conflict: A Variational Inequality Approach | |
| Jin Xu; Yves Zenou; Junjie Zhou | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-04-03 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study a very general contest game in which players exert efforts in multiple battles. The conflict structure, which represents who participates in which battlefield, is arbitrary and can be represented by a hypergraph. We show, under mild conditions on the cost function and contest technology, that the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria is nonempty and convex, and provide equivalent characterizations using techniques from Variational Inequality (VI). We demonstrate that the strong monotonicity of the cost function always implies the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium regardless of the conflict structure. We also perform an extensive comparative statics analysis with respect to the parameters of the model and discuss several applications of our model. Our general model incorporates many existing models of single or multi-battle contests as special cases when the conflict network and/or the cost function take particular forms. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Network games Contests Variational inequality |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13647 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542506 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jin Xu,Yves Zenou,Junjie Zhou. DP13647 Networks in Conflict: A Variational Inequality Approach. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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