G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP13647
DP13647 Networks in Conflict: A Variational Inequality Approach
Jin Xu; Yves Zenou; Junjie Zhou
发表日期2019-04-03
出版年2019
语种英语
摘要We study a very general contest game in which players exert efforts in multiple battles. The conflict structure, which represents who participates in which battlefield, is arbitrary and can be represented by a hypergraph. We show, under mild conditions on the cost function and contest technology, that the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria is nonempty and convex, and provide equivalent characterizations using techniques from Variational Inequality (VI). We demonstrate that the strong monotonicity of the cost function always implies the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium regardless of the conflict structure. We also perform an extensive comparative statics analysis with respect to the parameters of the model and discuss several applications of our model. Our general model incorporates many existing models of single or multi-battle contests as special cases when the conflict network and/or the cost function take particular forms.
主题Public Economics
关键词Network games Contests Variational inequality
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp13647
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542506
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Jin Xu,Yves Zenou,Junjie Zhou. DP13647 Networks in Conflict: A Variational Inequality Approach. 2019.
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