| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13654 |
| DP13654 The Threat of Intervention | |
| Vyacheslav Fos; Charles Kahn | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-04-05 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a model in which an activist shareholder can discipline management through intervention and through the threat of intervention. A weaker disciplinary role played by the intervention mechanism leads to lower firm value and more frequent ex post interventions. Thus, more frequent ex post interventions are not necessarily a sign of enhanced economic efficiency. In general, we show that the ex ante threat and ex post intervention can act as complements or substitutes. Because we endogenize the activist's choice of toehold, we also show that the effect of liquidity trading on firm value depends on the timing of liquidity trading. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13654 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542513 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Vyacheslav Fos,Charles Kahn. DP13654 The Threat of Intervention. 2019. |
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