| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13665 |
| DP13665 Art Auctions | |
| Kathryn Graddy; Orley C Ashenfelter | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-04-10 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Works of art and culture are sold by many means. These include transactions between dealers and their customers, auctions with open outcry, internet auctions, and even, occasionally, sealed bid auctions. However, the standard procedure for establishing art valuations for the most expensive works is still most commonly the English auction, where prices ascend in open bidding. This paper describes how art auctions really work, along with the state of competition between auction houses. For expensive art, competition is dominated by the duopoly of Christie's and Sotheby’s. The paper proceeds to describe various interesting features of art auctions, including the declining price anomaly, whether or not auctioneers provide accurate information, and anchoring effects in art auctions. The public auction system provides a valuable method for setting and determining values; it is probable that the inability of auctioneers to capture a significant part of the benefits of the information they produce leads to less use of the auction system than is optimal for society. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Art auctions |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13665 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542524 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Kathryn Graddy,Orley C Ashenfelter. DP13665 Art Auctions. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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