G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP13671
DP13671 Anticompetitive Vertical Merger Waves
Jerome Pouyet; Johan Hombert; Nicolas Schutz
发表日期2019-04-13
出版年2019
语种英语
摘要We develop a model of vertical merger waves and use it to study the optimal merger policy. As a merger wave can result in partial foreclosure, it can be optimal to ban a vertical merger that eliminates the last unintegrated upstream firm. Such a merger is more likely to worsen market performance when the number of downstream firms is large relative to the number of upstream firms, and when upstream contracts are non-discriminatory, linear, and public. On the other hand, the optimal merger policy can be non-monotonic in the strength of synergies or in the degree of downstream product differentiation.
主题Industrial Organization
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp13671
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542530
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Jerome Pouyet,Johan Hombert,Nicolas Schutz. DP13671 Anticompetitive Vertical Merger Waves. 2019.
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