| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13671 |
| DP13671 Anticompetitive Vertical Merger Waves | |
| Jerome Pouyet; Johan Hombert; Nicolas Schutz | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-04-13 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a model of vertical merger waves and use it to study the optimal merger policy. As a merger wave can result in partial foreclosure, it can be optimal to ban a vertical merger that eliminates the last unintegrated upstream firm. Such a merger is more likely to worsen market performance when the number of downstream firms is large relative to the number of upstream firms, and when upstream contracts are non-discriminatory, linear, and public. On the other hand, the optimal merger policy can be non-monotonic in the strength of synergies or in the degree of downstream product differentiation. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13671 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542530 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jerome Pouyet,Johan Hombert,Nicolas Schutz. DP13671 Anticompetitive Vertical Merger Waves. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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