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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP13671 |
DP13671 Anticompetitive Vertical Merger Waves | |
Jerome Pouyet; Johan Hombert; Nicolas Schutz | |
发表日期 | 2019-04-13 |
出版年 | 2019 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We develop a model of vertical merger waves and use it to study the optimal merger policy. As a merger wave can result in partial foreclosure, it can be optimal to ban a vertical merger that eliminates the last unintegrated upstream firm. Such a merger is more likely to worsen market performance when the number of downstream firms is large relative to the number of upstream firms, and when upstream contracts are non-discriminatory, linear, and public. On the other hand, the optimal merger policy can be non-monotonic in the strength of synergies or in the degree of downstream product differentiation. |
主题 | Industrial Organization |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13671 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542530 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jerome Pouyet,Johan Hombert,Nicolas Schutz. DP13671 Anticompetitive Vertical Merger Waves. 2019. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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