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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP13673 |
DP13673 When Governments Promise to Prioritize Public Debt: Do Markets Care? | |
Mitu Gulati; Ugo Panizza; Mark Weidemaier; Grace Willingham | |
发表日期 | 2019-04-14 |
出版年 | 2019 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | During the European sovereign debt crisis of 2011-13, some nations faced with rising borrowing costs adopted commitments to treat bondholders as priority claimants. That is, if there was a shortage of funds, bondholders would be paid first. In this article, we analyze the prevalence and variety of these types of commitments and ask whether they impact borrowing costs. We examine a widely-touted reform at the height of the Euro sovereign debt crisis in 2011, in which Spain enshrined in its constitution a strong commitment to give absolute priority to public debt claimants. We find no evidence that this reform had any impact on Spanish sovereign bond yields. By contrast, our examination of the U.S. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico suggests that constitutional priority promises can have an impact, at least where the borrower government is subject to supervening law and legal institutions. |
主题 | International Macroeconomics and Finance |
关键词 | Sovereign debt Debt sustainability Sovereign spreads |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13673-0 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542532 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Mitu Gulati,Ugo Panizza,Mark Weidemaier,et al. DP13673 When Governments Promise to Prioritize Public Debt: Do Markets Care?. 2019. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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