| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13692 |
| DP13692 The Seniority Structure of Sovereign Debt | |
| Matthias Schlegl; Christoph Trebesch; Mark Wright | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-04-23 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Sovereign governments owe debt to many foreign creditors and can choose which creditors to favor when making payments. This paper documents the de facto seniority structure of sovereign debt using new data on defaults (missed payments or arrears) and creditor losses in debt restructuring (haircuts). We overturn conventional wisdom by showing that official bilateral (government-to-government) debt is junior, or at least not senior, to private sovereign debt such as bank loans and bonds. Private creditors are typically paid first and lose less than bilateral official creditors. We confirm that multilateral institutions like the IMF and World Bank are senior creditors. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; International Macroeconomics and Finance |
| 关键词 | Sovereign default Arrears Insolvency Priority Imf Official debt Sovereign bonds International financial architecture Pecking order |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13692 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542553 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Matthias Schlegl,Christoph Trebesch,Mark Wright. DP13692 The Seniority Structure of Sovereign Debt. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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