| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13697 |
| DP13697 Patronage and Selection in Public Sector Organizations | |
| Edoardo Teso; Emanuele Colonnelli; Mounu Prem | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-04-26 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In all modern bureaucracies, politicians retain some discretion in public employment decisions, which may lead to frictions in the selection process if political connections substitute for individual competence. Relying on detailed matched employer-employee data on the universe of public employees in Brazil over 1997-2014, and on a regression discontinuity design in close electoral races, we establish three main findings. First, political connections are a key and quantitatively large determinant of employment in public organizations, for both bureaucrats and frontline providers. Second, patronage is an important mechanism behind this result. Third, political considerations lead to the selection of less competent individuals. |
| 主题 | Development Economics |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13697 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542559 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Edoardo Teso,Emanuele Colonnelli,Mounu Prem. DP13697 Patronage and Selection in Public Sector Organizations. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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