| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13711 |
| DP13711 Sharing Guilt: How Better Access to Information May Backfire | |
| Roman Inderst | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-05-02 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study strategic communication between a customer and an advisor who is privately informed about the best suitable choice for the customer, but whose preferences are misaligned with the customer’s preferences. The advisor sends a message to the customer who, in turn, can secure herself from bad advice by acquiring costly information on her own. We find that making the customer’s information acquisition less costly, e.g., through consumer protection regulation or digital information aggregation and dissemination, leads to less prosocial behavior of the advisor. This can be explained by a model of shared guilt, which predicts a shift in causal attribution of guilt from the advisor to the customer if the latter could have avoided her ex post disappointment. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Shared guilt Trust Guilt aversion Responsibility diffusion Advice |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13711 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542574 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Roman Inderst. DP13711 Sharing Guilt: How Better Access to Information May Backfire. 2019. |
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