| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13723 |
| DP13723 Persuasion on Networks | |
| Konstantin Sonin; Georgy Egorov | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-05-08 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze persuasion in a model, in which each receiver might buy a direct access to the sender's signal or to rely on her network connections to get it. For the sender, a higher slant increases the impact per direct receiver, yet diminishes the willingness of agents to receive information. Contrary to naive intuition, the optimal propaganda might target peripheral, rather than centrally-located agents, and is at its maximum levels when the probability that information flows between agents is close to zero or nearly one, but not in-between. The impact of the network density depends on this probability as well. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Propaganda Networks Bayesian persuasion Percolation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13723-0 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542585 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Konstantin Sonin,Georgy Egorov. DP13723 Persuasion on Networks. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
