| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13738 |
| DP13738 Preemption Contests Between Groups | |
| Stefano Barbieri; Kai Konrad; David A. Malueg | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-05-16 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We consider a preemption game between groups where the first agent to take a costly action wins the prize on behalf of his group. We describe the equilibrium solution of this problem when players differ in their own costs of action and these costs are private information. The equilibrium is typically characterized by delay. The nature of the equilibrium depends on key parameters such as the number of groups and their size. More competition between groups reduces delay, whereas in larger groups members of a given cost type are more reluctant to act but may yield an earlier resolution of the conflict. We analyze asymmetries across groups, focusing on group size and strength of the externalities within groups. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Free riding Preemption Dynamic conflict Inter-group conflict Incomplete information Waiting |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13738 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542602 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Stefano Barbieri,Kai Konrad,David A. Malueg. DP13738 Preemption Contests Between Groups. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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