| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13755 |
| DP13755 Who Benefits When Firms Game Corrective Policies? | |
| Mathias Reynaert; James Sallee | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-05-24 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Firms sometimes comply with externality-correcting policies by gaming the measure that determines policy. This harms consumers by eroding information, but it benefits them when cost savings are passed through into prices. We develop a model that highlights this tension and use it to analyze gaming of automobile carbon emission ratings in the EU. We document startling increases in gaming using novel data. We then analyze the effects of gaming in calibrated simulations. Over a wide range of parameters, we find that pass through substantially outweighs information distortions; on net, consumers benefit from gaming, even when they are fooled by it. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Gaming Corrective taxation Goodhart's law Environmental regulation Carbon emissions Automobiles Fuel economy |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13755 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542620 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Mathias Reynaert,James Sallee. DP13755 Who Benefits When Firms Game Corrective Policies?. 2019. |
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