| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13770 |
| DP13770 What Do Employee Referral Programs Do? | |
| Guido Friebel; Matthias Heinz; Mitchell Hoffman; Nick Zubanov | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-05-30 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Employee referral programs (ERPs) are randomly introduced in a grocery chain. Larger bonuses increase referrals and decrease referral quality, though the increase in referrals is modest. Still, ERPs are highly profitable, partly, because referrals stay longer than non-referrals, but, mainly, because non-referrals stay longer in treated stores than in control stores. In a post-RCT firmwide ERP rollout, referral rates remain low for grocery jobs, but are high for non-grocery jobs, which are perceived as more attractive. Our results (1) are consistent with referral-making being driven by money and altruism toward friends; (2) show that ERPs can have substantial benefits beyond generating referrals. The most-supported mechanism for (2) is that workers value being involved in hiring. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Referrals Employee referral programs Hiring Respect Turnover altruism |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13770 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542637 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Guido Friebel,Matthias Heinz,Mitchell Hoffman,et al. DP13770 What Do Employee Referral Programs Do?. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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