| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13773 |
| DP13773 Disincentives from Redistribution: Evidence on a Dividend of Democracy | |
| Rupert Sausgruber; Axel Sonntag; Jean-Robert Tyran | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-06-01 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We experimentally study the disincentive effect of taxing work and redistributing tax revenues when redistribution is imposed vs. democratically chosen in a vote. We find a “dividend of democracy” in the sense that the disincentive effect is substantially smaller when redistribution is chosen in a vote than when it is imposed. Redistribution seems to be more legitimate, and hence less demotivating, when accepted in a vote. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Redistribution Disincentive effect Voting Legitimacy Real effort task Lab experiment |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13773 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542640 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Rupert Sausgruber,Axel Sonntag,Jean-Robert Tyran. DP13773 Disincentives from Redistribution: Evidence on a Dividend of Democracy. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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