G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP13773
DP13773 Disincentives from Redistribution: Evidence on a Dividend of Democracy
Rupert Sausgruber; Axel Sonntag; Jean-Robert Tyran
发表日期2019-06-01
出版年2019
语种英语
摘要We experimentally study the disincentive effect of taxing work and redistributing tax revenues when redistribution is imposed vs. democratically chosen in a vote. We find a “dividend of democracy” in the sense that the disincentive effect is substantially smaller when redistribution is chosen in a vote than when it is imposed. Redistribution seems to be more legitimate, and hence less demotivating, when accepted in a vote.
主题Public Economics
关键词Redistribution Disincentive effect Voting Legitimacy Real effort task Lab experiment
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp13773
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542640
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Rupert Sausgruber,Axel Sonntag,Jean-Robert Tyran. DP13773 Disincentives from Redistribution: Evidence on a Dividend of Democracy. 2019.
条目包含的文件
条目无相关文件。
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[Rupert Sausgruber]的文章
[Axel Sonntag]的文章
[Jean-Robert Tyran]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[Rupert Sausgruber]的文章
[Axel Sonntag]的文章
[Jean-Robert Tyran]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[Rupert Sausgruber]的文章
[Axel Sonntag]的文章
[Jean-Robert Tyran]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。