| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13809 |
| DP13809 Empirical evidence on repeated sequential games | |
| Riccardo Ghidoni; Sigrid Suetens | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-06-19 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Sequentiality of moves in an infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma does not change the conditions under which mutual cooperation can be supported in equilibrium as compared to simultaneous decision-making. The nature of the interaction is different, however, given that the second mover in a sequential-move game does not face strategic uncertainty. We study in an experiment whether sequentiality has an effect on cooperation rates. We find that with intermediate incentives to cooperate, sequentiality increases cooperation rates by around 40 percentage points, whereas with very low or high incentives to cooperate, cooperation rates are respectively very low or high in both settings. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Cooperation Infinitely repeated game Sequential prisoner's dilemma Strategic uncertainty Experiment |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13809 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542683 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Riccardo Ghidoni,Sigrid Suetens. DP13809 Empirical evidence on repeated sequential games. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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