| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13831 |
| DP13831 Bank Assets, Liquidity and Credit Cycles | |
| Federico Lubello; Ivan Petrella; Emiliano Santoro | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-06-28 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study how bank collateral assets and their pledgeability affect the amplitude of credit cycles. To this end, we develop a tractable model where bankers intermediate funds between savers and borrowers. If bankers default, savers acquire the right to liquidate bankers' assets. However, due to the vertically integrated structure of our credit economy, savers anticipate that liquidating financial assets (i.e., loans) is conditional on borrowers being solvent on their debt obligations. This friction limits the collateralization of bankers' financial assets beyond that of real assets (i.e., capital). In this context, increasing the pledgeability of financial assets eases more credit and reduces the spread between the loan and the deposit rate, thus attenuating capital misallocation as it typically emerges in credit economies à la Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). We uncover a close connection between the collateralization of bank loans, macroeconomic amplification and the degree of procyclicality of bank leverage. |
| 主题 | Monetary Economics and Fluctuations |
| 关键词 | Banking Bank collateral Liquidity Capital misallocation Macroprudential policy |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13831 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542706 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Federico Lubello,Ivan Petrella,Emiliano Santoro. DP13831 Bank Assets, Liquidity and Credit Cycles. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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