| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13841 |
| DP13841 Moral Hazard and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm | |
| Patrick W. Schmitz | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-07-04 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In the Grossman-Hart-Moore property rights theory, there are no frictions ex post (i.e., after non-contractible investments have been sunk). In contrast, in transaction cost economics ex-post frictions play a central role. In this note, we bring the property rights theory closer to transaction cost economics by allowing for ex-post moral hazard. As a consequence, central conclusions of the Grossman-Hart-Moore theory may be overturned. In particular, even though only party A has to make an investment decision, B-ownership can yield higher investment incentives. Moreover, ownership matters even when investments are fully relationship-specific (i.e., when they have no impact on the parties' disagreement payoffs). |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Incomplete contracts Ownership rights Investment incentives Relationship specificity Moral hazard |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13841 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542717 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Patrick W. Schmitz. DP13841 Moral Hazard and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm. 2019. |
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