| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13854 |
| DP13854 Dividend Policy Decisions and Ownership Concentration: Evidence from Thai Public Companies | |
| Christian Wolff; J. Thomas Connelly | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-07-12 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In this paper we examine the relationship between ownership concentration and dividend policy for Thai publicly listed companies. High family ownership firms have higher dividend payouts than low family ownership firms, which we interpret to mean high family ownership firms follow a more rational dividend policy. This finding is consistent with the prediction that agency conflicts between the managers and shareholders are lower at firms with a controlling shareholder. The evidence is robust through different econometric specifications, robust when the level used to determine the extent of family ownership (family control) is lowered to 10 percent of the outstanding shares, and robust to the inclusion of the ownership wedge as a proxy for the severity of agency conflicts. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Family ownership Control Payout policy Agency conflicts |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13854 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542730 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Christian Wolff,J. Thomas Connelly. DP13854 Dividend Policy Decisions and Ownership Concentration: Evidence from Thai Public Companies. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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