| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13868 |
| DP13868 Information Design with Agency | |
| Eduardo Perez-Richet; Adrien Vigier; Jacopo Bizzotto | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-07-15 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We consider a general information design problem in which the task of producing information is delegated to an agent who can privately choose between the procedure designed by the principal and a default procedure. Procedures are constrained as to which messages they use, and possibly how they may be used. The principal can incentivize the agent via transfers conditioned on messages. This gives rise to a moral hazard problem in which the principal faces a trade-off between generating information that is persuasive in the continuation game, or generating information about the choice of the agent so as to lower the cost of agency. We provide a general methodology to solve such problems, and characterize an optimal procedure. We apply our results to information acquisition and persuasion examples. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Information design Moral hazard Agency cost Information acquisition |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13868 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542744 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Eduardo Perez-Richet,Adrien Vigier,Jacopo Bizzotto. DP13868 Information Design with Agency. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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