| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13870 |
| DP13870 The Wall Street Stampede: Exit as Governance with Interacting Blockholders | |
| Dragana Cvijanovic; Amil Dasgupta; Konstantinos Zachariadis | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-07-16 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In firms with multiple blockholders governance via exit is affected by how blockholders react to each others' exit. Institutional investors, who hold the majority of equity blocks, are heterogeneous in their incentives. How do these incentives affect the manner in which institutional blockholders respond to each others' exit? We present a model that shows that open-ended institutional investors, who are subject to investor redemption risk, will be sensitive to an informed blockholder's exit, giving rise to correlated exits and strengthening governance. Thus, exposure to redemption risk, universally a negative force in asset pricing, plays a positive role in corporate governance. Using data on engagement campaigns by activist hedge funds we present large-sample evidence consistent with our theoretical mechanism. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Corporate governance Institutional investors Exit Herding |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13870 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542745 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Dragana Cvijanovic,Amil Dasgupta,Konstantinos Zachariadis. DP13870 The Wall Street Stampede: Exit as Governance with Interacting Blockholders. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
