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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP13872 |
DP13872 The Social Costs of Side Trading | |
Thomas Mariotti; Andrea Attar; François Salanié | |
发表日期 | 2019-07-19 |
出版年 | 2019 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We study resource allocation under private information when the planner cannot prevent bilateral side trading between consumers and firms. Adverse selection and side trading severely restrict feasible trades: each marginal quantity must be fairly priced given the consumer types who purchase it. The resulting social costs are twofold. First, second-best efficiency and robustness to side trading are in general irreconcilable requirements. Second, there actually exists a unique budget-feasible allocation robust to side trading, which deprives the planner from any capacity to redistribute resources between different types of consumers. We discuss the relevance of our results for insurance and financial markets. |
主题 | Financial Economics |
关键词 | Adverse selection Side trading Second-best allocations |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13872 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542748 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Thomas Mariotti,Andrea Attar,François Salanié. DP13872 The Social Costs of Side Trading. 2019. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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