| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13878 |
| DP13878 Divided Government, Delegation, and Civil Service Reform | |
| Massimo Morelli; Elliott Ash; Matia Vannoni | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-07-20 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper sheds new light on the drivers of civil service reform in U.S. states. We first demonstrate theoretically that divided government is a key trigger of civil service reform, providing nuanced predictions for specific configurations of divided government. We then show empirical evidence for these predictions using data from the second half of the 20th century: states tended to introduce these reforms under divided government, and in particular when legislative chambers (rather than legislature and governor) were divided. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13878 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542753 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Massimo Morelli,Elliott Ash,Matia Vannoni. DP13878 Divided Government, Delegation, and Civil Service Reform. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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