| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13881 |
| DP13881 Incomplete Contracts, Limited Liability, and the Optimality of Joint Ownership | |
| Patrick W. Schmitz | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-07-21 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The property rights approach to the theory of the firm is the most prominent application of the incomplete contracting paradigm. A central conclusion of the standard model says that joint ownership is suboptimal. In this note, we analyze a modified version of the standard model that is tailored to the organization of R&D activities, where one of the parties is wealth-constrained and protected by limited liability. It turns out that joint ownership can be optimal, since it avoids wasteful rent-seeking activities when limited liability rents are necessary to induce high effort. Our results are in line with the fact that R&D activities are often conducted in research joint ventures. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Property rights Incomplete contracts Limited liability Rent seeking Joint ownership |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13881 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542756 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Patrick W. Schmitz. DP13881 Incomplete Contracts, Limited Liability, and the Optimality of Joint Ownership. 2019. |
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