| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13891 |
| DP13891 On Selecting the Right Agent | |
| Kfir Eliaz; Kareen Rozen; Geoffroy de Clippel; Daniel Fershtman | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-07-24 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Each period, a principal must assign one of two agents to some task. Profit is stochastically higher when the agent is qualified for the task. The principal cannot observe qualification. Her only decision is which of the two agents to assign, if any, given the public history of selections and profits. She cannot commit to any rule. While she maximizes expected discounted profits, each agent maximizes his expected discounted selection probabilities. We fully characterize when the principal's first-best payoff is attainable in equilibrium, and identify a simple strategy profile achieving this first-best whenever feasible. We propose a new refinement for dynamic mechanisms (without transfers) where the designer is a player, under which we show the principal's next-best, when the first-best is unachievable, is the one-shot Nash. We show how our analysis extends to variations on the game accommodating more agents, caring about one's own performance, cheap talk and losses. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Dynamic allocation Mechanism design without transfers Mechanism design without commitment |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13891 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542768 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Kfir Eliaz,Kareen Rozen,Geoffroy de Clippel,et al. DP13891 On Selecting the Right Agent. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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