| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13905 |
| DP13905 Collateral and Asymmetric Information in Lending Markets | |
| Vasso Ioannidou; Nicola Pavanini; Yushi Peng | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-08-06 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the benefits and costs of collateral requirements in bank lending markets with asymmetric information. We estimate a structural model of firms’ credit demand for secured and unsecured loans, banks’ contract offering and pricing, and firm default using credit registry data in a setting where asymmetric information problems are pervasive. We provide evidence that collateral mitigates adverse selection and moral hazard. With counterfactual experiments, we quantify how an adverse shock to collateral values propagates to credit supply, credit allocation, interest rates, default, bank profits, and document the relative importance of banks’ pricing and rationing in response to this shock. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Asymmetric information Structural estimation Credit markets Collateral |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13905-0 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542785 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Vasso Ioannidou,Nicola Pavanini,Yushi Peng. DP13905 Collateral and Asymmetric Information in Lending Markets. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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