| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13917 |
| DP13917 A Theory of Power Wars | |
| Helios Herrera; Massimo Morelli; Salvatore Nunnari | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-08-08 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper provides a theory of how war onset and war duration depend on the initial distribution of power when conflict triggers a reallocation of power but the loser is not eliminated. In the model, players take into account not only the expected consequences of war on the current distribution of resources, but also its expected consequences on the future distribution of military and political power. We highlight three main results: the key driver of war, in both the static and the dynamic game, is the mismatch between military and political power; dynamic incentives usually amplify static incentives, leading forward-looking players to be more aggressive; and a war is more likely to last for longer if political power is initially more unbalanced than military power and the politically under-represented player is militarily advantaged. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | War duration Balance of powers |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13917 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542798 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Helios Herrera,Massimo Morelli,Salvatore Nunnari. DP13917 A Theory of Power Wars. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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